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University of Maryland University College
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Introduction
There is an innate tension between modernizing and
traditional strains in countries with strong religious traditions.
The modernizing strain views modernization through
Western eyes. It approaches social justice and change from
the viewpoint of the nation-state, with citizenship as the key
ingredient. Modernization promotes social and economic
development in order to provide socialjustice. Each individual
benefits from his or her social participation as a part of a
national identity. In essence, modernization is measured
by various indices, such as public health, state education,
industrialization, post-industrial progress, increase in scale,
mass communication, and mass mobilization; it is a central
component of one's existence. This is the key to fulfillment in
terms of both individual identity and socioeconomic goals.
This traditional strain is evident in Turkey. Muslim
cultures have attempted to reconcile the secular Islamic
model with the traditional Islamic model that looks to the
Qur'an as the source of both individual and group identities.
Turkey has attempted to assume a post-Islamic identity
which includes the role of women.
The role ofwomen in a traditional society with religiouslydefined proscriptions on their position in culture and society
is a flash point in Turkey, a country which is dealing with
the challenges of modernization. An examination of the role
of women in the fields of human services, employment, and
political participation is a measure of the balance between
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2008
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traditional religion and modern trends in cultural status and
economic, political, and social equality.
The 19th Century
Education has proved to be the key to equality in Turkey
since 1869. This includes elementary schools, whether part
of the medrese networks (the madrasahs, or religiouslyrun schools) that ran the gamut from elementary (Qur 'anic
schools, often in mosques) to university level, or as secular
schools that were made mandatory in that year. Villages of
500 households were to have public elementary education
units with separate schools for boys and girls and for Muslims
and non-Muslims, if the affected areas were sufficiently
heterogeneous in nature. The schools had lessons in religion
(of the students) in Turkish, Arabic, or Persian; arithmetic;
accounting; mathematics; geometry; world and Ottoman
history; geography; and the most important language of the
area. (Since elementary school could run through the early
teens, some of these subjects such as accounting or geometry
were meant to be related to professional training.)
Middle schools (idada) were to be established in towns
or cities of one thousand households or more and were to
include three years of instruction. The curriculum included
Turkish and French, logic, economic, geography, world and
Ottoman history, mathematics, algebra, accounting, physical
sciences, and basic draftsmanship.
Senior secondary schools, or sultana schools, were to be
placed in provincial capitals and had to accept all graduates
of middle schools. As these schools charged tuition, only the
wealthier families could afford them. Nevertheless, a very
good student could attend on scholarship. Their curriculum
included humanities, Arabic, Persian, French, economic,
international law, history, logic, engineering, algebra,
trigonometry, all sciences, and land surveying.
1
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By the end of the Tanzimat (reform) period in Turkish
history (1876), the opportunity for education on a nonsectarian and non-class basis had expanded in keeping with
the premise of equality for all. Both elementary and trade
schools were made available to orphans and poor boys.
Trade schools were opened to retrain adults. Muslim adults
were given continuing and adult educations in Istanbul.
In 1873, a free lycee, or secondary school, was established
for Muslim orphans. The Ministry of Education established
provincial educational councils which disbursed money for
buildings, teacher salaries, books, and libraries. Under the
Public Education Law of 1869, teachers were certified, as
were lessons, curriculum, and texts.
This certification applied to the numerous foreign
missionary elementary and secondary schools which had
been established in the 1860s and 1870s. By the 1890s, over
90 percent of all school-aged boys and over one-third of
school-aged girls were attending elementary school. By that
time, secular elementary and secondary school attendance
(including non-Muslims) outnumbered medrese attendance,
especially in the cities. Even though the waqf{the non-profit
foundation in many Muslim lands supported by religious
taxes) remained active in charitable affairs, it was no longer
dominant in education. Similarly, the ulema (ulama, or
religious scholars) also lost their monopoly, especially in
higher education.
2

3

4

The Young Turk Period
During the Young Turk period (1908-1918), other direct
benefits for women occurred. The Young Turks allowed
women to attend public middle and secondary schools or
to acquire their education at some of the newly established
private schools for girls. Between 1911 and 1923, the
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country experienced almost constant warfare that resulted in
the deaths of many men, including teachers, thereby creating
teaching positions for women. Women were allowed to open
businesses and received professional training in areas such
as law and medicine. Religious courts that had repressed
women's rights were placed under the control of the Ministry
of Justice in 1917. Family law enacted in 1917 gave women
the right to use the court to enforce stipulations of their
marriage vows.
5

The Turkish Republic
During the Turkish Republic (after 1923), perhaps the
most significant reform was in the emancipation of women.
As in many Islamic societies, Turkish women had remained
secluded and were allowed very little education. Often they
were veiled at fourteen, married at 15 or 16, and spent the rest
of their lives at home. When they did venture out, they were
fully covered from head to foot—usually in black or gray
all-concealing clothing—with the exception of one or both
eyes. This mode of dress is known as the chador or burka.
Women sat in separate sections of public transportation so
that they were not exposed to the gaze of men. Polygamy
was generally practiced, since the Qur 'an allowed marriage
to as many as four wives.
Between 1920 and 1940, the clothing restrictions were
gradually eliminated and women were allowed to go about
without the chador; they were actually encouraged to wear
modern or Western clothes, particularly in the metropolitan
areas. The women of the countryside were slower to adopt
the modern garb, but the practice did spread.
By 1920, polygamy had been made subject to the consent
of the first wife. A civil code was established in 1926 that gave
women equal rights with regard to marriage and property.
6
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It subsequently become possible for a woman to divorce,
but a husband could no longer divorce his wife without her
consent. The civil code also gave women equal rights in all
legal matters, in addition to marriage and property matters.
Women were given the right to hold municipal office and
to vote in municipal elections in 1930. They were given
complete voting rights in 1935. Beginning in 1935, women
could serve in the National Assembly. In the 1990s, Turkey
had its first female Prime Minister, Tansu (filler.
Universal primary and secondary education was
introduced in the 1930s, and it became quite common for
girls to be educated. Business and professional opportunities
were made available to women. By 1940, many women,
particularly in the cities, worked in shops, banks, and
business offices, and it was common to see women as
teachers, physicians, lawyers, and judges. Turkey appeared
to be evolving into a typical Western society.
One significant development in the last few years has
been the growth of the women's movement, and this has been
evident in the increased support for women's issues among
both Islamists and modernizers. People have attempted an
amalgam between the two traditions. Many modern Turkish
women wear a stylish headscarf called a tesittim as a way
of sharing both modernity and Islam. This often brightcolored and ornate garment exhibits both a sense of style as
reasonably secularist and also a sense of wanting to show
respect to Islamic tradition.
Islamist women, who claim to be also modernist, state
that they are against patriarchal domination and support the
parts of Islamic doctrine that promote women's education,
workers, and politically active Islamic activities for the public
good. This is part of the reaction against the Kemalist laicism,
which took the form of totally rejecting Islamic symbols
and conservative Turkish social practices, proclaiming the
7
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superiority of modernity. People now say that the women's
movement aims to end class, status, and gender cleavage in
favor of social justice for all.
The condition of women has been an issue between
modernizers and Islamists. The adoption of the civil code that
gave women legal rights in 1926, and the equal suffrage of
women in 1934, was considered a hallmark of modernization.
Similarly, Kemalists maintained that the pre-Islamic Turks
of Central Asia practiced true equality.
In general, Kemal Ataturk equated female progress
with societal progress. He claimed that a republic needed
democracy and recognition of women's rights; hence
women's rights would be "recognized" and if knowledge
and technology are necessary for society, both men and
women have to have "equal access to this." In fact, the major
milestones in the republic in terms of modernization, i.e.,
secularization, Westernization, elimination of the Caliphate
and religious orders, secular education, language reform
(replacing the Arabic alphabet with a Roman alphabet), a
Western calendar, and the metric system, all seem equally
beneficial to both genders.
The private lives of women, however, especially in the
rural areas and in private sexual matters, remained subordinate
during the Kemalist period. In the otherwise modern civil
code, for instance, the husband is designated the head of the
family and the chooser of the place of residence, as well as
the provider for the family. Private female relations remained
patriarchal.
Turkish feminists, in the last 25 years, have campaigned
for equality in all aspects of life. This ideal was often in
conflict with Kemalist women, who pushed a republican
nationalist line that only elite women could achieve.
Professional equality of most women would be justified by
9
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their modern education, even if traditional family relations
and child rearing remained supreme in private life. The last
25 years has seen this template somewhat modified in an
increasingly urban and individualistic Turkey.
At the same time, gender tension has remained. Men and
women may congregate in the office or factory, but segregation
often continues in gender-related tea breaks, coffee breaks,
and canteen and lunch room sections. Dress and deportment
also may signal a point of fissure between modern and
traditional and Islamic. Economics may necessitate women
in the workplace coming into contact with men who are
not relatives, but they have not been habituated even in the
classroom to interact on an equal fashion.
Sometimes, extreme ends meet in the traditional Islamic
and feminist, in that both have argued against the modern
middle-of-the-road secularist. Recently, for example, Islamic
women joined with radical feminists to demand womenonly buses and other public transport in Turkish cities. The
motivation of one party was public protocol; the motivation
of the other was equalization, but the ends did meet.
Social progress has been more apparent than real in some
areas in Turkey, especially in the rural areas and the poorer
sections of urban areas. One recent poll had shocking results
for many Turks when it ranked Turkey 105 out of 115 on an
international list on the status of women, in part due to the
disparity between the elite and mass of Turkish women.
15
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The Current Situation
The current crisis over the wearing of headscarves in
Turkey is a prime example of the symbolic role of women
in the interaction between the forces of modernization and
Islam. (It should be noted that this issue has also become
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2008
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a political controversy in European countries, particularly
France.)
Although the Turkish constitution has never directly
outlawed the headscarf in state-sponsored institutions, it has
become an issue of controversy over the last quarter century.
However, in recent decades, partially in response to the rise
of Islamist-based political parties and as a reaction to the
Iranian revolution, Kemalists and secularists in the judiciary
have resorted to the Constitutional Court to rule against
the wearing of headscarves on the basis of violation of the
nation's equality and secularism.
In the late 1980s and the 1990s a series of laws was
passed hostile to the wearing of religious garb such as
the headscarf, but it stopped short of outright prohibition.
Initially, the legislation was for the protection of women
who chose not to wear headscarves and who were subject to
hostile pressure at universities and other public institutions
from the more pious.
However, the number of women who wore the headscarf
on universities increased, in spite of adverse reaction from
various university administrations. One rationale for the
overthrow of the previous Islamic party, Refa (Welfare),
and the government's subsequent dissolution in 1997-1998
was, according to the Court and its military supporters, the
encouragement of "practices that have emerged against the
law and will direct Turkey to an outdated appearance." The
successor to the outlawed Welfare Party, the Virtue Party,
was dissolved in 1999 for anti-secular activities including
the wearing of the headscarf.
The secularists received support for their implicit ban on
the headscarf when the European Court of Human Rights in
2005 ruled that a university could prohibit the wearing of
headscarves because the Turkish Constitution stated that the
19
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state should not show a preference for a particular religion
or belief. This provision could include state-sponsored
institutions, including universities. At last count, close to 100
of Turkey's 116 universities were still unofficially observing
the ban.
The present ruling Islamic party had been circumspect
in its approach to this issue during its first term (between
2002 and 2007). However, after a significant party victory
in the summer of 2007, and after pressure by some of its
devout professional women, and a smaller coalition partner,
it passed two rather mildly-worded amendments. Article 10
concerned equality and article 42 concerned the right to pursue
education without impediment unless specifically stated by
law; they were passed in February, 2008. Headscarf wearing
women felt that these amendments were too innocuous.
Nonetheless, in reaction to these two amendments,
especially amendment 42, the opposition Kemalist secular
Republican People's Party appealed this action to the chief
prosecutor, who brought the case to the Constitutional
Court on the grounds that the two amendments, especially
amendment number 42, violated the separation of church
and state. The chief prosecutor went even further and
recommended that the government and the party (AKP) be
dissolved and that 71 of its members, including the prime
minister, be banned from public life. This has been a recent
pattern in Turkey, whereby the Islamic party is dissolved and
then replaced by a newer one.
On June 5, 2008 the Constitutional Court of Turkey
annulled the AKP-sponsored laws on the grounds that
the these provisions allowing women to wear an Islamic
headscarf in universities violated the secular spirit of the
Constitution. Although the party had disowned its Islamist
roots in order to strengthen Turkey's bid to join the EU (and
20
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is now supported by pro-business liberals and center-right
politicians including secularists), it appeared in danger of
being banned.
The hardcore secularists are centered in the military,
judiciary, parts of the bureaucracy, and much of academe.
However, the party has argued that the ban on headscarves
violated freedom of conscious and the right of women to
have an education. Thus, there is the supreme irony of a
party originally identified with an Islamic movement not
known as supporting non-traditional rights for women,
including modern education, should now support an action
on the grounds of both liberty of conscience as well as rights
for women in opposition to modernist secularists.
On July 30, the Court by a vote of 6 of 11 voted to ban
the AKP. Since seven votes were needed, the party survived.
However, its funds were slashed in half. The whole episode
epitomized the fragile equilibrium between secularists and
Islamists when it came to a woman's apparel.
The role of women is central in today's conflict between
Kemalist and secular modernists, on the one hand, and
traditional Islamists in Turkey, on the other. The former
view has maintained that women's role in society must be
restructured if Turkey is to be accepted by the West. Legal
and educational reforms in the 1920s and 1930s were meant
to empower women so that they would have equal status, at
least in the public sphere.
Islamists have believed that segregation of the sexes
is fundamental for morality in society. Although Islamists
in Turkey accept some degree of association between the
sexes in the public sphere, they support the separation of
young girls in public facilities and in institutions such as
elementary schools. The covering of young women and girls,
23
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especially the wearing of the headscarf, is a central tenet of
this philosophy.
Each tradition feels that it represents the true Turkey.
Secularists feel that certain Islamic practices such as
the covering up of women are characteristic of the most
backward segments of society — the rural areas and smaller
towns, particularly in eastern Anatolia. Islamists feel that
elite western customs especially in the larger cities in western
and central Turkey (Istanbul, Izmir, Edirne, and Ankara), are
a foreign non-national intrusion.
Some secularists are often a bit taken aback in recent
decades to see well-educated professional women who have
chosen to continue to wear the headscarf out of "personal
choice" as well as religious tradition. Indeed the tradition
of tolerance about choice has carried over to public opinion.
A recent poll found that 70 percent of Turks felt it was
acceptable for women to wear headscarves and 64 percent
of Turkish women do so in daily life. Nevertheless, the
levers of power—the military, judiciary, bureaucracy, and
much of the media and academe—are with the secularists so
that, if seven judges of the 11- member Constitutional Court
had decided so, the government and party could have been
dissolved.
Although the European Union Court of Human Rights has
ruled in the past in favor of secular positions, the European
Union has declared that the ballot box not the court should
decide if a party remains in power. As Turkey continues to
seek admission to the European Union, this factor cannot be
ignored.
Nonetheless, the position taken against headscarves has
had an adverse impact on genuinely religious professional
women in terms of professional advancement in their chosen
careers. Headscarved women attorneys are barred from
25
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representing clients in court and are barred from sitting in
the parliament. Qualified women who interview for positions
in banking, engineering, medicine, and other professions
may find their chances, at least in large metropolitan areas,
diminished in interviews and in wages.
In rural areas and in small towns in eastern Anatolia, the
opposite may occur for women without headscarves as they
face persecution for not wearing the garment. Women are
subject to prejudice whichever choice that they may make,
so polarizing has this debate become.
According to some estimates, nearly half of all students
expelled from universities since 2000 have been because of
the headscarf issue. In addition, after the dissolution of the
Welfare Party and the Virtue Party, a citation for wearing the
headscarf caused over 1,000 civil servants and more than
300 primary and secondary school teachers to lose their
positions. Some estimates put the number of discharged
female teachers at 5,000 since the early 1980s.
A recent study conducted by the World Bank detailed
the often glaring disparity between women and men in areas
such as health, education, and employment. This report used
standards established by the United Nations Convention for
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) as well as standards established by European
Union which Turkey desires to join. In compliance with this
desire and international standards, Turkey has modified its
legislation in recent years by mandating gender-neutral laws
in its new Civil Code (2002) and well as added amendments
to its Labor Code (2003). However, Turkey has, in the
opinion of external observers, some deficiencies within its
Penal Code which does not deal with sensitive subjects such
as "honor killings," marital rape, and the specific minimum
age for marriage.
28
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The report was especially telling when it compared
the wages of female university graduates to those of male
university graduates. In the public sector, the compensation
of female university graduates was 76 percent of male
university graduates; in the private sector it declined to 68
percent. Overall, there continues to be a discrepancy between
male and female illiteracy and access to education. As late
as 1999, 77 percent of women were literate as opposed to
94 percent of men; in 2001, 59 percent of secondary school
students were men and 41 percent were women. Although
42 percent of university graduates were women, it was
more a tribute to their tenacity, as only about 15 percent of
university-aged women attended university as opposed to 26
percent of men of university age.
The issue of relatively low enrollment and a higher drop
out rate for females has different causes in different sections
of the country. In the modernizing west economic reasons
are given for these actions while in the more traditional east
socio-cultural causes predominated. Recent legislation has
attempted to remedy this situation by making education from
grades one to eight mandatory.
Reality on the ground may differ if other aspects of
education are examined. Women are closer to men in
academic tracks, a favorable omen for career development,
but there is a greater differentiation in the vocational and
technical tracks. Moreover textbooks, classroom settings,
and educational supervisors are overwhelmingly male.
Health access has remained unequal according to the
report. In part, this is due to the general limitation on access
to health education as part of the gender educational disparity.
The particularly large disparity in vocational and technical
education is one such factor. Young boys were more likely to
receive medical treatment than young girls. Males continued
30
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to make most of the decisions on fertility, especially in rural
areas and in eastern Anatolia, even though induced abortion
(up to 10 weeks) is a legal option.
There also continues to be a double standard in terms of
premarital sexual activity. In this regard, traditional methods
of contraception were favored over the pill. Examination
and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases were often
limited by tradition. Some families still insisted on premarital testing but not on post-abortion treatment. Maternal
mortality remained high by European standards and there is
no overall approach to female health.
Gender discrepancies remain in most economic sectors
in terms of participation in both the private and public
sectors. These discrepancies carry over into earning power,
work conditions, and benefits. The situation is aggravated
by the relative lack of childcare and on-the-job-training for
females who continue to perform the majority of domestic
tasks—especially in providing for the time-consuming needs
of young children.
Ironically, the movement to freer markets and less
regulation, as opposed to the Kemalist emphasis on the statist
economy, has left women more vulnerable to discrimination
in working conditions, wages, and social security. There has
been an overall decline in official participation of women,
because young females leave work for marriage and children
(with no guarantee of jobs being kept during maternal leave)
while rural migrants with little education often face substandard treatment.
The deregulation of the economy has left women open
to exploitation by unscrupulous male employers who
circumvent official legal standards in a manner reminiscent
of the treatment of undocumented workers in the United
States and Western Europe. Women often turn to the non31
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formal sector in the underground economy. This "grey
market" does not give protection to women who lack access
to the infrastructure and resources available in the public
sector and official private sector.
The only area where there is true parity for top female
managers is the public sector; female compensation is at 96
percent of their male counterparts. However, the percentage
of female compensation to male compensation dropped to
80 percent for top female managers as opposed to top male
managers in the private sector
Men had a much higher percentage in industrial
employment (80 percent) while women were more likely
to be employed in services such as finance, insurance, real
estate, and business (34 percent) as well as community,
social, and personal services (31 percent). However, men
continued to lead as late as 2001 in employment in the public
sector (74 percent) and private sector (84 percent).
Women were nearly twice as likely to be unemployed.
Social Security covered 60 percent of men as compared to 20
percent of women. While a survey of developing countries
indicated that 28 percent of entrepreneurs were women,
the figure for Turkey was 15 percent. Access to credit and
financial support for women entrepreneurs in both the urban
and rural areas has, according to the report, been limited
by both traditional attitudes and insufficient institutional
support in the more free-wheeling economic atmosphere in
place since the 1980s.
The most glaring disparity between legislative fiat and
institutional reality lies in the realm of decision making.
Turkey has a General Directorate on the Status and Problems
of Women that does function as a central coordinating unit
for gender equality, as well as a number of organizations
dedicated to more training for women, consciousness32
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raising. In addition, specific lobbying groups promote
gender-sensitive legislation that includes shelters for
battered women. However, the situation of women in terms
of decision-making position remains quite rudimentary.
The World Bank in its report placed Turkey 110
overall among 173 countries surveyed in regard to female
officeholders. It reported that in the early part of this decade,
women composed just 4.4 percent of members of parliament
and less than 2 percent of local legislative members. These
statistics compared unfavorably even with other sectors that
involved women, especially with education—33.7 percent
in professional positions, 17 percent in public affairs, and
11.5 percent of managers.
In other representative organizations such as labor
unions women only constituted approximately 10 percent
of membership. The women's branches of political parties
and trade and labor union tended to concentrate on parochial
issues and were devoid of real power.
While quota systems for women had been instituted for
some political parties, the two largest (the governing AK/
AKP or the Justice and Development Party and the main
opposition CHP or Republican Peoples Party) did not have
them.
Non-government organizations (NGOs) that have been
active in the cause of women's rights since the mid-19th
century have proven to be ineffectual as they have been
divided among Kemalist/secularist, Islamic, Kurdish, and
leftist associations whose agendas have differed. An indirect
index on real attitudes toward women and their relatively low
societal status is obvious in the lack of specific legislation on
domestic violence, communal violence, and official violence
(treatment of women in police custody and detention). Even
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol59/iss59/4
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bride-price still exists in some rural sections of the country
especially in the southeast.
These fissures are on full display in the headscarf
controversy, which epitomizes the central dividing line in
contemporary Turkey on gender equality and individual
rights. Many secularists believe that the current governing
Islamic-rooted AK party, as well as its Muslim predecessors,
are aiming for the quiet Islamization of the country via
lobbying for the wearing of headscarves for women and
support for the segregation of women in public parks.
Secularists of the Kemalist school begun by Ataturk
dominated most of Turkish life at least until 1950; after 1938,
the rule of his Republican Party so ensured. This tradition
was supported through 1980 by a coalition of army people,
the bureaucracy, the judiciary, academe, media, business, and
urban-educated middle and upper classes. They characterized
their opponents as uneducated clerically dominated peasants
from rural areas and from small towns from backward areas
particularly from eastern Anatolia.
In recent decades, however, except for the military, this
coalition has been penetrated. Many constituents of the old
coalition, especially in the professional and business classes,
have been persuaded by political Islam (as opposed to
radical Islam, which opposes all modern accretions — at least
in theory). Many have come to see the secularists as being
obscurantist in their unyielding opposition to headscarves.
At the same time, many religious people from rural areas
and small towns from all parts of the country have joined the
middle class through education and economic policies such
as import substitution (which prevailed through the 1980's)
that created new opportunities, thus making it easier for
Islamists to accept modernization. Various social movements
including the revival of Sufi mystical orders and the Gulen
34
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movement readily embraced modern aspects of education,
technology, and communication so as to enhance their appeal
to professional and middle classes including women.
Nonetheless, activities directly or indirectly connected to
the position of women have aroused suspicions of creeping
Islamization by Muslim-influenced local and municipal
authorities. These include the segregation of women in parks
and other public facilities, revocation of liquor licenses, and
the use of Islamic texts in local state-run schools. At the
heart of the dispute and indeed for the hearts and minds of
individual Turks is the Islamic concept of morality as a most
essential aspect of human existence. They say that morality
should be regulated by Islam in both public and private
spheres via the Qur 'an (Holy Book), Haditha (sayings of the
Prophet), the Sharia (Islamic law), the Medreses (religious
schools), and Ulema (religious scholars).
Secularists will argue that individual choice and
conscience determine morality. (As was indicated earlier, the
positions have been somewhat reversed, with Islamist AK
arguing for the headscarf on the grounds of gender equality
and individual choice while the secularists have argued that
it violates civil code and the separation of church and state
as mandated in the Turkish constitution.) This is the cultural
divide in Turkey today.
Overall, although women have an equal legal status in
Turkish society, the headscarf controversy, in conjunction
with the continued influence of the patriarchal household,
makes this equality more apparent than real.
35

Conclusion
Islamic pressure, which seeks to enforce its values upon
modern Turkey, has been, in fact, influenced by the forces of
modernization. This can be seen in its modified position on
education and career advancement, political participation,
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and some aspects of dress. However, the balance between
modernization and Islam is still a work in progress. This is
the case when it comes to the status and role of women caught
between the crosscurrents of a modernizing world and the
continued pull of traditional religion. The open espousal of
Islamic sensitivities (in part a reaction to enforced laicism
during the Kemalist phase of the Turkish Republic) has now
caused a reaction among secular segments of society. The
role of women as symbolized by the choice to wear or not
wear a headscarf is the central focus of this struggle.
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